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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                       
 
BRODY, District Judge, 
 Plaintiff, David Venen, appeals from the district 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant United States 
in this suit for damages Venen claims resulted from unauthorized 
tax collection actions, failure to release a tax lien, and 
unauthorized disclosure of tax return information.  This appeal 
presents two issues. 
 The first issue is whether the plaintiff exhausted his 
administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district 
court for damages from unauthorized tax collection actions and 
failure to release a tax lien.  We hold that plaintiff's failure 
to comply with the regulations constitutes a failure to exhaust 
and, therefore, the grant of summary judgment on these claims is 
proper. 
 The second issue arises in the claim for unauthorized 
disclosure of tax return information.  Although the Tax Code 
generally prohibits the disclosure of tax return information, it 
authorizes disclosure when the tax return information relates to 
collection activity, including a levy on assets to satisfy an 
outstanding tax liability.  Plaintiff contends that the levies 
  
against his assets were unlawful and therefore the information 
relating to the levies was impermissibly disclosed.  The question 
is whether it is relevant that the levy is unlawful.  We hold 
that it is not and, therefore, that the grant of summary judgment 
on the disclosure claim is proper. 
 28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives us jurisdiction. 
 I. 
 Venen's Amended Complaint asserts claims for 
unauthorized tax collection actions under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 
(Counts I, III and IV); failure to release a tax lien under 26 
U.S.C. § 7432 (Counts II and V); and unauthorized disclosure of 
tax return information under 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (Count VI).  The 
district court granted summary judgment for defendant on Counts 
I-V on the ground that Venen had failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies as required by sections 7432 and 7433.  The court also 
granted summary judgment for defendant on Count VI, holding that 
the disclosures did not give rise to damages under section 7431 
because the Internal Revenue Service of the United States (IRS) 
made the disclosures to obtain information to collect taxes. 
 The district court's grant of summary judgment is 
subject to plenary review.  American Medical Imaging Corp. v. St. 
Paul Fire ad Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1991).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
  
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  Defendants are entitled to summary judgment only if no 
reasonable resolution of the conflicting evidence and the 
inferences that could be drawn from that evidence could result in 
a judgment for plaintiffs.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  "[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of 
evidence in support of plaintiffs['] position will be 
insufficient[;] there must be evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably find for the plaintiff[s]."  Id. at 252.  Since the 
district court made no findings of fact, we will state the facts 
from the record viewed in the light most favorable to Venen, the 
non-moving party. 
 Venen's claims result from efforts by the IRS to 
collect the federal income taxes he owed for a ten-year period, 
from 1977 through 1986.  In July 1979, Venen filed his tax 
returns for years 1977 and 1978.  In March 1985, Venen filed 
federal tax returns for years 1979 through 1983.  Shortly 
thereafter, Venen entered into an agreement with the IRS to pay 
his taxes in installments.  The installment agreement covered tax 
years 1977 and 1978 as well as 1979 through 1983.1 
 On November 27, 1987, while Venen was complying with 
the installment agreement, the IRS issued to Venen's employer the 
                     
     
1
  Appendix at 52a (Defendant's Statement of Material Facts 
as to Which it Contends There is no Genuine Issue ¶ 3).  The 
record does not contain the actual installment agreement. 
  
first of four disputed Notices of Levy to collect taxes.  This 
Notice of Levy was for the collection of taxes for the years 1980 
through 1984 and 1986.  After that notice was issued but before 
the IRS issued a second notice, Venen met with IRS Agent Argento, 
who placed the account on "non-collectible status."  Appendix at 
118a (Affidavit of David Venen ¶ 10). 
 On September 25, 1990 the IRS issued a second Notice of 
Levy to Venen's employer for tax years 1977 and 1978.  In October 
1990, IRS Agent Gregorakis "reviewed the file at Venen's request 
and told Venen that the levy should not have been issued in view 
of Venen's 'non-collectible' status, apologized, and said the 
levy would be released."  Appendix at 118a (Venen Affidavit ¶ 
12).  On January 15, 1991, the IRS issued a third Notice of Levy 
to Venen's employer for tax years 1977 and 1978, and a fourth on 
April 17, 1991 to his employer and to his bank, for tax years 
1977 through 1984 and 1986.   
 After "numerous negotiations" between Venen and the IRS 
to release the fourth levy, Agent Gregorakis told Venen that no 
further administrative remedies were available.  Appendix at 119a 
(Venen Affidavit ¶¶ 16 & 18).  On June 27, 1991 Venen's attorney 
confirmed that representation in a letter to Agent Gregorakis 
stating "It is my understanding that you stated all 
administrative remedies have been exhausted and should we wish to 
pursue the matter further [Venen's] only recourse would be to 
file a civil suit against the Internal Revenue Service."  
  
Appendix at 214a (Letter from Attorney Peter Suwak to Agent 
Gregorakis).  The letter asks Agent Gregorakis to respond if that 
understanding is incorrect.  Id.  Agent Gregorakis did not 
respond and does not recall receiving the letter. 
 Venen's complaint is based on improper collection 
activities, including breach of the installment agreement by 
attempts to levy on Venen's wages and bank account.  Count VI is 
based on improper disclosures relating to those activities, 
specifically disclosures contained in the notices of levy. 
 A.   
 In Counts I through V, Venen asserts claims under 26 
U.S.C. § 7432 for failure to release a tax lien and under 26 
U.S.C. § 7433 for unauthorized tax collection activities.2  Both 
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  Section 7432 provides:   
 
 (a) If any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue 
Service knowingly, or by reason of negligence fails to 
release a lien under section 6325 on property of the 
taxpayer, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for 
damages against the United States in a district court 
of the United States. 
 . . .  
 (d)  Limitations. -- 
  (1)  Requirement that administrative remedies be 
exhausted. -- A judgment for damages shall not be 
awarded . . . unless the court determines that the 
plaintiff has exhausted the administrative 
remedies available to such plaintiff within the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
 
 Section 7433 provides: 
 
 (a)  In general. -- If, in connection with any 
collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, 
any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service 
recklessly or intentionally disregards any provision of 
  
Tax Code provisions require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative 
remedies before filing a civil suit.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7432(d) 
and 7433(d).  Failure to exhaust deprives the court of 
jurisdiction.  Information Resources, Inc. v. United States, 950 
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 Treasury regulations specify the administrative 
remedies to exhaust.  Administrative remedies for section 7432 
are set forth in Treasury Regulation § 301.7432-1; remedies for  
section 7433 are found in Treasury Regulation § 301.7433-1.  Both 
regulations apply to "civil actions . . . filed in federal 
district court after January 30, 1992."  Because Venen filed suit 
September 25, 1992, the regulations apply to this case.  See 
McGarvin v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,325 (E.D. Mo.), 
aff'd 12 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 An administrative claim for failure to release a tax 
lien must include the taxpayer's identifying information, a copy 
of the notice of lien affecting the property, the grounds for the 
(..continued) 
this title, or any regulation promulgated under this 
title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for 
damages against the United States in a district court 
of the United States.  Except as provided in section 
7432, such civil action shall be the exclusive remedy 
for recovering damages resulting from such actions. 
 . . .  
 (d)  Limitations. -- 
  (1)  Requirement that administrative remedies be 
exhausted. -- A judgment for damages shall not be 
awarded . . . unless the court determines that the 
plaintiff has exhausted the administrative 
remedies available to such plaintiff within the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
  
claim, a description of injuries, and the amount of the claim.  
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7432-1(f).  An administrative claim for 
unauthorized collection actions also must include identifying 
information, the grounds for the claim, a description of 
injuries, and the amount of the claim.  See Treas. Reg. § 
301.7433-1(e).   
 Both regulations require a taxpayer to make the claim 
for relief "in writing to the district director . . . in the 
district in which the taxpayer currently resides."  Treas. Reg. 
§§ 301.7432-1(f); 301.7433-1(e).  The Seventh Circuit has held 
that a letter addressed to the revenue officer listed on the 
notice of levy did not comply with a similar treasury regulation 
requiring a written request "addressed to the district director."  
Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. United States, No. 93-2915 (7th 
Cir. July 1, 1994) (considering Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(2)).  
The failure to comply deprives a court of jurisdiction even 
though the IRS has received actual notice of the claim and never 
informs the taxpayer of the proper procedures.  Amwest, slip op. 
at 11. 
 Venen failed to comply with the regulations under 
sections 7432 and 7433.  He argues that the letter to Agent 
Gregorakis explaining that he understands he has exhausted his 
administrative remedies satisfies the regulations.  Venen's 
letter is inadequate to trigger administrative review both 
because it is addressed to a revenue agent and not to the 
  
district director, see Amwest, slip op. at 11, and because it 
does not specify the grounds for relief, see Treas. Reg. §§ 
301.7432-1(f) and 301.7433-1(e).  Agent Gregorakis' alleged 
failure to respond to the letter does not excuse Venen.  As the 
Seventh Circuit held, a failure to petition the IRS correctly is 
a failure to exhaust even if the IRS does not inform a taxpayer 
of proper procedures.  Amwest, slip op. at 11. 
 Finally, Venen argues that he is excused from the 
exhaustion requirement because exhaustion would be futile.  Venen 
bases his futility argument on Information Resources, Inc. v. 
United States, 950 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1992), in which the Fifth 
Circuit held that then-applicable administrative remedies under 
section 7432 were excused because the IRS already had provided 
the only relief authorized by the remedies--release of the lien.  
Information Resources, 950 F.2d at 1127.  Current remedies under 
section 7432, effective since the Fifth Circuit decided 
Information Resources, provide that administrative relief may 
include damages.  Administrative relief under the other section 
at issue here, section 7433 also may include damages.  See 26 
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7432-1(f) and 301.7433-1.  The IRS has not 
awarded or denied Venen damages on his claims.  Therefore, the 
IRS has not granted all available administrative relief and 
exhaustion would not be futile. 
 The district court's grant of summary judgment on 
Counts I-V is, therefore, affirmed. 
  
 B. 
 In Count VI, Venen seeks damages under 26 U.S.C. § 
7431, which provides a civil cause of action for knowing or 
negligent disclosure of tax return information in violation of 26 
U.S.C. § 6103.3  Title 26 U.S.C. § 6103 establishes the principle 
that tax return information is confidential and may not be 
disclosed except in certain situations, including those 
enumerated in section 6103(k). 
 To prevail in his claim under section 7431, Venen must  
"demonstrate [1] a violation of Section 6103, and [2] that such a 
violation resulted from knowing or negligent conduct."  Elias v. 
United States, No. CV 90-0432, 1990 WL 264722, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 21, 1990), aff'd 974 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992).  Because we 
hold that Venen has not demonstrated a violation of section 6103, 
we do not reach the second requirement. 
 Section 6103(a) states that "[r]eturns and return 
information shall be confidential, and except as authorized by 
this title . . . no officer or employee of the United States  
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 Section 7431 provides: 
 
 (a) 
 (1) . . . If any officer or employee of the United 
States knowingly, or by reason of negligence, discloses 
any return or return information with respect to a 
taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 6103, 
such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages 
against the United States in a district court of the 
United States. 
  
. . . shall disclose any return or return information."  26 
U.S.C. § 6103(a).  Section 6103(k)(6) contains the authorization 
relevant to this case.  It provides that: 
 
 An internal revenue officer or employee may, in 
connection with his official duties relating to any 
audit, collection activity or civil or criminal tax 
investigation or any other offense under the internal 
revenue laws, disclose return information to the extent 
that such disclosure is necessary in obtaining 
information which is not otherwise reasonably 
available, with respect to the correct determination of 
tax, liability for tax, or the amount to be collected 
or with respect to the enforcement of any other 
provision of this title.  Such disclosures shall be 
made only in such situations and under such conditions 
as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation. 
26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(6).  Regulations promulgated under the 
provision permit disclosure to obtain information necessary "to 
apply the provisions of the Code relating to establishment of 
liens against [the taxpayer's] assets, or levy on, or seizure, or 
sale of, the assets to satisfy any [outstanding] liability." 
Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(b)(6). 
 Venen's section 7431 claim is based on disclosures of 
return information in the four contested Notices of Levy.  There 
is no dispute that these disclosures were necessary to effect the 
levies and that information may be properly disclosed under 
section 6103(k)(6) "to effect a . . . levy."  Elias, at *4.  
Venen maintains, however, that the disclosures violated section 
6103(k)(6) because the underlying levies were unlawful.  He 
contends that the levies were unlawful because they were issued 
  
while he was complying with an installment agreement and his 
account was on non-collectible status.  Venen's factual 
contention that the levies were unlawful is material only if an 
authorized disclosure of information under section 6103(k)(6) is 
converted into an unauthorized one when the disclosure occurs in 
the process of establishing an unlawful levy. 
 Courts are split on whether the validity of the 
underlying levy affects disclosure under section 6103.  One line 
of cases holds that "whether a disclosure is authorized under  
§ 6103 is in no way dependent upon the validity of the underlying 
summons, lien or levy."  Elias, 1990 WL 264722 at *5.  See, e.g., 
Tomlinson v. United States, 1991 WL 338328 (W.D. Wash. 1991) 
(validity of lien irrelevant), aff'd 977 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 
1992); Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D.N.C. 
1987) (permissible to disclose information under mistaken 
impression that taxes are due), aff'd 849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 
1988); Bleavins v. United States, 807 F. Supp. 487, 489 (C.D. 
Ill. 1992) ("§ 7431 does not apply to disputed merits of an 
assessment"), aff'd 998 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 Another line of cases does consider the validity of the 
levy to be relevant to disclosure under section 6103.  The Eighth 
Circuit, without analysis, concludes that disclosure in pursuance 
of an unlawful levy violates section 6103(k)(6).  Rorex v. 
Traynor, 771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding levy unlawful due 
to compliance with installment agreement).  See also Maisano v. 
  
United States, 908 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1990) (although not 
specifically linking the two, considering validity of the 
underlying tax liens and levies before finding IRS authorized to 
disclose under § 6103); William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. 
v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 
(following Rorex rule that improper notice of levy is basis for 
liability), rev'd on other grounds 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(reversing because information already public record and 
therefore not protected by § 6103), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 956 
(1992). 
 We join those cases that decline to consider the 
validity of the underlying levy in deciding whether the IRS has 
disclosed in violation of section 6103.  The history of section 
6103 indicates that Congress enacted the provision to regulate a 
discrete sphere of IRS activity--information handling.  Prior to 
the amendment of section 6103 in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, tax 
returns were public records but subject to inspection and 
disclosure only under special circumstances, including upon order 
of the President.  United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  Under the former provision, the IRS provided 
extensive tax return information to various governmental 
agencies.  S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 317 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746.   
 During the amendment process in 1976, Congress 
expressed concern that those disclosures "breache[d] a reasonable 
  
expectation of privacy on the part of the American citizen with 
respect to such information."  Id.  The breach threatened to 
undermine our voluntary tax assessment system.  Id.  By the 
amendment of section 6103, Congress sought to restore taxpayer 
confidence in the privacy of return information.  Elias, 1990 WL 
264722 at *4.  The revised provision balances the taxpayer's 
expectation of privacy with the government's need to collect 
taxes by making information confidential "except in those limited 
situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103 where it 
was determined that disclosure was warranted."  S. Rep. No. 94-
938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.  The Tax Reform Act also contained an 
enforcement mechanism for section 6103.  Section 7217, the 
predecessor statute to section 7431, provided a civil damages 
remedy for knowing or negligent disclosures in violation of 
section 6103.  26 U.S.C. 7217 (Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(e) 
(1976)).4 
 In a claim such as the present one based on an improper 
levy, the concern is not improper information handling but rather 
improper collection activity.  Collection activity is a separate 
sphere of IRS activity governed by a separate body of law.  For 
example, the Tax Code specifies procedures for assessing 
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  In 1982, Congress replaced section 7217 with section 
7431, which remedies the same conduct but names the United States 
rather than the IRS employee as the proper defendant.  Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, § 357(a) (1982). 
  
deficiencies and for levying against property.  See §§ 6321-6326 
(tax liens) and 6331-6334 (tax levies).  The enforcement 
mechanism for collection provisions is 26 U.S.C. § 7433.  It 
creates a civil cause of action for damages "[i]f, in connection 
with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, 
any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service 
recklessly or intentionally disregards any provision of this 
title, or any regulation promulgated under this title" and is the 
"exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting from such 
actions."  26 U.S.C. § 7433.  Venen did bring claims under 
section 7433 in Counts I, III, and IV, which were barred by his 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
 These two bodies of law must remain distinct.  Section 
6103 and its attendant damages provision, section 7431, were 
meant to regulate only one sphere of activity--information 
handling--and were "not intended to interfere with . . . 
collection actions."  Flippo, 670 F. Supp. at 641 (describing 
section 7431).  Thus, the propriety of the underlying collection 
action, in this instance the validity of the levy, is irrelevant 
to whether disclosure is authorized under section 6103 and the 
basis for liability under section 7431. 
 The history and structure of the Tax Code's damages 
scheme compels this result.  Congress reacted to concerns about 
violations of privacy in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 by protecting 
return information and creating a damages remedy for unauthorized 
  
disclosures that are the result of knowing or negligent conduct.  
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103 and 7217 (now § 7431).  Congress addressed 
concerns about improper collection actions in 1988, when it 
enacted section 7433.  The legislative history of that provision 
sheds light on the scope of section 7431.  The House Report 
states that, under current law in 1988, "[t]axpayers d[id] not 
have a specific right to bring an action against the Government 
for damages sustained due to unreasonable actions taken by an IRS 
employee."  H. Rep. No. 100-1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 228 
(1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5288.  That statement 
suggests that section 7431, by its incorporation of section 6103, 
did not reach the conduct remedied by section 7433--improper 
collection actions. 
 Venen's interpretation of section 7431 would undermine 
the culpability requirement of section 7433.  Although the Senate 
Amendment for Section 7433 proposed a cause of action to 
encompass careless, reckless or intentional unauthorized 
collection actions, section 7433 as enacted provides a claim only 
for reckless or intentional actions.  1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5289.  
Venen's position would allow a taxpayer to premise liability 
under section 7431 on an unauthorized collection action that 
fails to meet the "reckless or intentional" culpability standard.  
Venen argues that disclosure in the course of an unauthorized 
collection action, such as an unlawful levy, violates section 
6103 and may create liability under section 7431.  Thus, Venen 
  
factors unlawful levies into the analysis under section 7431 
without imposing the requirement of section 7433 that the levy 
result from reckless or intentional conduct.  This reasoning 
opens the door for a taxpayer to base a section 7431 claim on 
negligent or even nonculpable conduct that leads to an unlawful 
levy.  A taxpayer would gain through the back door of section 
7431 what was specifically denied under section 7433.5 
 The plain language of section 6103 also mandates the 
conclusion that the lawfulness of the levy is irrelevant to 
whether disclosure is authorized.  The provision requires only 
that information be disclosed for one of the specified purposes--
here, "in connection with . . . collection activity . . . to 
obtain information . . . with respect to the correct 
determination of tax, liability for tax, or the amount to be 
collected or with respect to the enforcement of any other 
provision of this title."  § 6103(k)(6).  The regulations 
specifically authorize disclosure "to apply the provisions of the 
Code relating to establishment of liens against such assets, or 
levy on, or seizure, or sale of, the assets to satisfy any 
[outstanding] liability."  Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(b)(6).  
Neither the statute nor the regulations on their face authorize 
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  Some courts that do look behind collection activity seem 
to have responded to this problem by applying the "knowing or 
negligent" culpability requirement of section 7431 to the 
unlawful collection activity.  See, e.g., Chandler, 687 F. Supp. 
at 1520.  Even under that analysis taxpayers recover for less 
than reckless or intentional conduct. 
  
the court to consider whether the collection activity itself is 
proper.6  Cf. Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Note, Omnibus Taxpayers' 
Bill of Rights Act:  Taxpayers' Remedy or Political Placebo?  86 
Mich. L. Rev. 1787, 1812 n.162 (1988).  
 Finally, the result urged by Venen, making unlawful 
levies the basis for liability under section 7431, might impede 
the efficient and orderly collection of taxes.  Aware of possible 
liability, an IRS agent might feel the need to check the validity 
of the underlying levy before performing the routine task of 
establishing a levy to collect taxes.  Such a restraint could 
place an undue burden on collection activity.  
 The IRS disclosed Venen's tax return information in 
pursuit of a levy.  The IRS, therefore, has not violated section 
6103 and is not liable under section 7431.   
 Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant on Count VI is affirmed. 
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  The Rorex court was concerned that this reasoning 
"open[s] a significant loophole" in section 7431:  An IRS agent 
could disclose information "simply by making the disclosure in 
the form of a notice of levy."  Rorex, 771 F.2d at 386.  One 
court addressed this concern by holding that "[t]he provisions of 
section 6301(k)(6) [sic] do not authorize disclosures made after 
the government admits that the underlying assessment was in 
error."  Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 
1987).  Under our reasoning, because a court may not look behind 
a levy, section 6103 would authorize disclosure to establish a 
levy even if the IRS agent knows that there is no tax liability 
or that the levy is an improper means of collection.  In that 
circumstance, the taxpayer still has a remedy in section 7433 for 
reckless or intentional unauthorized collection activity. 
  
 C. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
